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the effect on crime of changing policy parameters. The policy parameters are the
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1.  Introduction
It is common, in the general discussion of crime and punishment as well as in the
scholarly literature on the subject, to distinguish between the incentive and the
incarceration effect of prison sentence.
1 This is intuitively natural; a longer prison
term is likely both to discourage (the incentive effect) and to disable (the incarceration
effect) people from engaging in criminal activities. One reason why these two
components of crime are so often discussed is probably that knowledge of their
respective magnitudes is important for the evaluation of crime policy. Despite the fact
that they are often discussed, however, there is no analytical treatment of them in the
literature. There is thus no analytical basis for systematic empirical studies on the
subject.
In the present paper, we will provide such an analytical decomposition of crime.
Incidentally, we will also derive a third effect, not previously discussed in the
literature, which we will call “the crime competition effect”. An emerging standard is
to treat crime and punishment in a general equilibrium framework;
2 this will be the
case in the present paper, too. Also, a meaningful treatment of prison sentences
requires an intertemporal model. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one
earlier paper in the literature that analyzes crime in an explicitly intertemporal
framework.
3
In virtually all papers on the economics of crime following Becker (1968), people are
assumed to differ with respect to their productivity in honest work. Low-productivity
individuals will thus choose to become criminals. An interesting feature of the
intertemporal approach is that it allows for other assumptions as to what determines
people’s choice of whether to engage in criminal activities. We have thus assumed
that everybody has the same productivity in honest work, but that people differ in
                                                       
1 Cf. for example Ehrlich (1981), Shavell (1987) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
2 See Fender (1999), Murphy et al. (1993) and Furlong (1987)). In addition, Ehrlich (1973), Carr-Hill
and Stern (1973) and Phillips and Votey (1975) use econometric models implying a general
equilibrium approach.2
terms of time preference. This is technically a minor issue; the model could be solved
using the standard assumption (i.e., different productivity and identical rates of time
preference) as well. But since the assumption of different time preferences has not
been made before, we choose it for the sake of novelty.
4 Moreover, the two
assumptions have slightly different policy implications, and it seems like an
interesting avenue for future research to work out the predictions of the two
approaches in order to assess their relative degree of realism against empirical data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the basic model is presented. Section
3 contains a general characterization of the model by means of numerical simulations.
In section 4 we discuss the decomposition of crime into the incentive, incarceration
and crime competition effects, and provide some numerical illustrations of their
magnitudes. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.  The Model
2.1 Individual Utilities
In each time period, an honest worker will earn a gross income w. Everybody has the
same wage rate, and the honest individual’s net earnings are thus  ) 1 ( t w − ,where t is
the tax rate. Working also inflicts some disutility on the individual. With an inelastic
labor supply, we could set the monetary equivalent of this disutility equal to a
constant a, which is the same for everybody. With a linear utility function,
5 the
instantaneous utility from work is thus  a t w − − ) 1 (.
                                                                                                                                                              
3 Davis (1988). That model is however not general equilibrium, and the approach is quite different from
ours.
4 Some writers have observed that in reality, criminals seem to have a very strong preference for
immediate gains as compared to future costs (see, for instance, DiIulio, 1996). This has sometimes
been interpreted as a contradiction to Becker’s approach to crime, indicating that criminals are simply
irrational. However, it can equally well be interpreted as a high rate of time preference, which is
perfectly compatible with rational behavior.
5 Although risk aversion is a relevant concept in this setup, where workers as well as criminals are
subject to risk, we will disregard this complication and assume risk-neutral agents. For discussions of
preferences as to risk in connection with crimes, see Becker (1968), Block and Heinecke (1975) and
Ehrlich (1996).3
With a probability λ , the worker will meet a criminal and get robbed of his net
earnings
6 and with a probability  ) 1 ( λ −  he will avoid such a fate. The expected
instantaneous utility of a worker is thus
[] a t w a a t w EuW − − − ≡ − + − − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( λ λ λ .
The ) ( a − λ  term stems from the fact that if the worker is robbed, only his disutility of
work (which is equal to –a) remains.
Next period, the person will go to his work again, and since there is no accumulation
of capital, there are no intertemporal links; each period will look exactly the same to
him as the previous one. This means that a person who has initially chosen to be
honest will remain so for the rest of his life. Under stationary conditions, the expected
lifetime utility of a worker (where we for simplicity have assumed an infinite life) is
thus
W W V a t w V δ λ + − − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 (, ( 1 )
where δ  is the discount factor. We assume that people differ with respect to their rate
of time preference, and that the discount factor δ  is uniformly distributed on [ 0, 1] .
One should not take the robbery scenario above too literally. It has been used to lend a
factual flavor to the exposition of the model, but the reasoning is in fact more general;
it could as well be used to analyze burglary, or fraud, or most other types of crime.
For the sake of exposition, however, the encounters between workers and criminals
will be described in terms of the robbery story throughout this paper.
For a criminal, life is somewhat more complicated. First, he has to encounter a victim.
This happens with a probability µ , and we make the simplifying assumption that a
                                                       
6 We have assumed that the tax is paid first, before leaving the workplace and running the risk of being
robbed. The alternative assumption is perhaps equally plausible and would not change anything in
principle in the model.4
criminal can meet at most one person per time period.
7 With probability  ) 1 ( µ −  he
does not encounter any victim, and his utility is then zero for that period.
Given that the criminal has encountered a victim, a robbery takes place. The booty is
what the worker carries on him, i.e., the period’s net income  ) 1 ( t w − . In the next
period, the police catches the robber with probability p, in which case he will be
sentenced to n periods in prison, each period yielding a utility –f. With probability
) 1 ( p − , he is not apprehended, in which case he can start all over again in the next
period: with probability µ  he meets a worker, etc.
The above scenario implies that for the criminal, there is a simple intertemporal link
in the model. If he robs a worker, and if he then gets caught by the police (this joint
event occurring with probability µ  p), his next period will not look exactly like the
previous one. Instead, he will enjoy n periods in prison. What makes the model simple
is, however, that this link is not based on any choice variable; there is no
accumulation of capital in the model, but the n-period prison term is the result of a
random draw only.
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Solving for  W V  in (1) and for  C V  in (2), we set  C W V V =  to obtain the cut-off discount
rate δ ˆ  at which an individual is indifferent between honest work and criminal
activity:
( )
) ˆ 1 ( ˆ ˆ 1
) ˆ 1 ( ˆ ) ˆ 1 )( 1 (
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7 In continuous time, this assumption is equivalent to assuming that encounters are Poisson distributed.
Since our model is cast in discrete time, such an assumption is less obvious, but we nevertheless make
it, for the sake of simplicity. As for the workers, there is no need to assume that they get robbed at most
once per time period; since they lose their entire net wage if an encounter takes place, it does not matter
whether they later, after having been robbed, happen to meet one more robber.5
This is an (n+1)th order equation in the unknown δ ˆ . For given probabilities λ , µ  and
p, it gives us the number of criminals
8 δ ˆ  and the number of workers  ) ˆ 1 ( δ − .
2.2 The Endogenous Probabilities
The traditional approach in the literature since Becker (1968) has been to regard crime
as a risky activity; with probability p the criminal is punished, and with probability
) 1 ( p −  he gets away with his deed. Honest work, on the other hand, is usually
assumed to be a safe activity. The implication of this, if one assumes risk-averse
individuals, is that ceteris paribus, people with a low degree of risk aversion will
choose to be criminals. We think this is not an altogether correct view of the world. In
reality, being a worker will be risky, too. In fact, many honest people complain of the
fear and the risk they perceive from high crime rates in their neighborhood. While we,
in our model, will not model risk aversion explicitly, we will model the fact that being
a worker is risky, too.
The probability that a worker will be robbed, λ , depends on the encounter technology.
Basically, the probability should be increasing in the number of criminals, and
decreasing in the number of workers. There are many ways to model such an
encounter technology, the simplest approach being to assume that in each period, a
worker meets exactly one person in the population, picked at random. If that person is
a criminal, the worker gets robbed.
The number of criminals in the population is δ ˆ . This group consists of i persons in
prison (internees) and  i − δ ˆ  persons outside prison (externees). Only the latter
constitute any danger to the workers. The total number of people in the streets is
) ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 ( i − + − δ δ , and thus the probability that the person you meet in the street is a
criminal is
                                                       
8 If one thinks the assumption of δ   having a uniform distribution on [ 0, 1]  is rather special, it should be
noted that the switchpoint condition (3) holds regardless of the distribution. The only difference is that


















The number of internees is, in stationary state, equal to the number of criminals
caught during a period, which is equal to  ) ˆ ( i p − δ µ , times the average term in prison:















) ˆ 1 ( 1
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− +
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Let us now turn to the criminal, i.e., the externee. Like in the case of the worker, we
assume that the criminal meets only one person per period of time. If he meets another
externee, nothing happens. If he meets a worker, a robbery takes place. The number of
potential victims is thus  ) ˆ 1 ( δ −  out of a total number of persons in the streets being
equal to  i i − = − + − 1 ) ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 ( δ δ . Thus the probability that the person he meets is a
worker is
λ µ − = 1. ( 5 )
As for p, the probability of apprehension, we have to assume an apprehension
technology. There are several alternatives, none of which is more realistic on a priori
grounds than the others.
One possible apprehension technology is based on random encounters between
policemen and (guilty) criminals, just like the probability of being robbed depended
                                                                                                                                                              
whereas for an arbitrary distribution, there exists a one-to-one relation between δ ˆ and the number of
criminals in society. Note that the population has been normalised to 1.7
on random encounters between workers and (not yet guilty) criminals. Thus the
probability p could be equal to the ratio of the number of policemen to the total
population in the streets, consisting of (robbed and non-robbed) workers, (successful
and unsuccessful) criminals, and policemen. This apprehension technology is quite
possible to model within our framework.
An alternative is to assume that the probability of apprehension depends on the
number of crimes per policeman. While the previous technology was based on the
image of policemen randomly strolling in the streets, this technology instead is based
on the image of a limited number of police investigators being burdened with a large
amount of paperwork. Each paper corresponds to one reported crime, and the larger
the number of papers, the smaller the probability that a particular case will be
satisfactorily solved. For the time being, we have chosen this technology. Letting χ










committed crimes of number
p ϕ χ ϕ ) ( .( 6 )
For the function  ) (χ ϕ , any function taking values between zero and unity is possible;
in our applications, we have chosen the exponential function. It turns out that the
number of crimes per policeman can be expressed on a very simple form in our
model.
Policemen are paid for by taxes. Total tax revenue is
∫ − ⋅ ⋅ ≡
1
ˆ
) ˆ 1 ( ) (
δ
δ δ w t dF w t .( 7 )
Assuming that a policeman has the same wage rate as a worker, tax revenue is
sufficient to hire  ) ˆ 1 ( δ − ⋅ t  policemen.
9
                                                       
9 For simplicity, we assume that there is no cost associated with keeping internees in prison. In order to
avoid too many choices of occupation, we have also assumed that the policemen are hired from8
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If we divide the number of crimes, given by (8), by the number of policemen, given
by (7), we can thus write the number of crimes per policeman as
) 1 )( ˆ 1 (
ˆ




= .( 9 )
Now, if we substitute λ , given by (5), into (4), we can solve the resulting expression
for δ ˆ and substitute into (9). This gives a surprisingly simple expression for the
number of crimes per policeman:
t / ) 1 ( µ χ − = .          (10)
Thus the probability of apprehension is  () t p α µ ϕ / ) 1 ( − = , where α  is a productivity












exp .          (11)
The importance of the endogenous probabilities λ , µ  and p should be emphasized. A
few authors, like Sah (1991) and Fender (1999), have recognized that an increase in
the total number of criminals in society will reduce, cetiris paribus, the probability
that an individual criminal be arrested. Thus a larger number of criminals can make
                                                                                                                                                              
somewhere outside the model economy. An alternative interpretation is that every honest person works
a fraction (1 – t) of his time at his ordinary job, and a fraction t at the police station. In principle, it
would not be a problem to let the population consist of three groups: policemen, workers, and
criminals. This would however only complicate the model without yielding any additional insights. As9
crime a more profitable activity. The other side of the coin, which we want to stress,
is that a larger number of criminals means more competition for the individual crook;
thus the probability µ  will fall. The net effect of the fall in p (which makes crime more
profitable) and the fall in µ  (which makes crime less profitable) has to be determined
in a general equilibrium model.
Equations (3), (4), (5) and (11) constitute the general equilibrium model
10 in the four
endogenous variables  , , , ˆ µ λ δ  and p. By successive substitutions the whole system
can be ultimately reduced to one equation in µ . The exogenous variables are the
technological parameters w, a, and α   together with the policy variables. We have
three policy variables: the tax rate t, the punishment f, and the length of the prison
term, n. Since the model is highly non-linear we must rely on numerical simulations
in order to derive its properties.
3.  Some Numerical Simulations
When solving this model numerically, we do not mainly aim at realism, but rather at
providing illustrations of some basic mechanisms in the model. Still, we do not want
to use utterly unrealistic parameter values. Our benchmark parameter values are the
following: w = 5, a = 1, α  = 5, f = 0, t = 0.05 and n = 10. This leads to a (stable)
solution where δ ˆ  = 0.2481, that is, 25 percent of the population choose to be
criminals
11.
We can now analyze how the model’s solution varies with the policy parameters at
the government’s disposal, i. e. with n, f and t. In Figure 1 we show δ ˆ  for different
values of the prison term, holding f and t constant at 0 and 0.05, respectively. In
general, the model has three roots, two of which are stable and one, which is
unstable.
12 The stable roots are depicted by the solid curves in the figure, while the
                                                                                                                                                              
a consequence of hiring policemen from outside the model, the government’s wage cost for hiring them
is w rather than w(1 – t).
10 Evidently we assume that agents have perfect information about the endogenous variables. For a
discussion of the learning process in crime models, see Sah (1991). Compare also the stability analysis
in the Appendix.
11 The (stable) benchmark solution for the other endogenous variables are µ  = 0.97 and p = 0.87.
12 The notion of stability in a model like this is not straightforward. It depends on the assumptions one
make regarding the behavior of the agents outside equilibrium. For a discussion of stability, see the
Appendix.10
unstable roots are depicted by a dashed curve. The vertical arrows, pointing towards
the solid curves and away from the dashed curve, illustrate the out-of-equilibrium
dynamics of the model.
There can thus be three equilibria in society. First, there is a high-crime equilibrium
with 1 ˆ = δ , i.e., everybody is a criminal. That this constitutes an equilibrium can be
intuitively understood: if everybody is a criminal, the probability that one will be
robbed, given that one is a worker, is unity. Thus  1 = λ  and  0 = µ . Since everybody
is a criminal, there is no tax base to pay for the police, and thus p = 0. The utility from
being a worker, who will be robbed with certainty, is zero. But since there are no
victims around, the utility of a criminal is also zero. Thus  W C V V =  and we have an
equilibrium. It can also be shown that this equilibrium must be stable.
13
We then have two interior equilibria: an unstable high-crime one where 40-60 percent
of the population are criminals, and a stable low-crime one where 10-30 percent are
criminals. It is interesting to note that these two equilibria only occur for the term in
prison being above a given minimum value. In this case the critical value is
9 . 5 min = n . Thus, as long as the prison term is longer than 5.9 time periods, society
can be at a stable low-crime equilibrium with δ ˆ  at around 10-30 percent (at the
borderline case of n = 5.9,  34 . 0 ˆ = δ ). If however the prison term is further reduced,
the crime rate will make a discrete jump to the other stable equilibrium of  1 ˆ = δ .
Without claiming that the numbers are realistic, this feature of the model nevertheless
sheds some light on the mechanics behind an observation sometimes made in the real
world: small changes in some parameter can cause a dramatic change in society.
Note that the value of  min n  depends on the parameter values chosen, i. e., in this case,
t = 0.05 and f = 0. For other values of these parameters,  min n  changes accordingly.
One could easily trace  min n  as a function of t and f, thereby illustrating the policy
                                                       
13 In the Fender (1999) model, there are also three solutions: one interior, stable, high-crime
equilibrium; one interior, unstable, low-crime equilibrium; and one stable equilibrium where the
number of criminals equals zero. Inspection of equations (3)-(5) and (11) shows that our model also
can produce an equilibrium with δ ˆ  = 0. However, this equilibrium exists only if a = 0.11
options open to society.
14 This would result in a surface in three-dimensional space (n,
f, t) such that all points above the surface would yield interior equilibria 1 ˆ < δ , while
all points below the surface would yield only a high-crime equilibrium  1 ˆ = δ .
The shape of the solution set in Figure 1 of course depends on the parameter values
chosen. To check the general characteristics of the model, we have tried many other
combinations of w, a, α , f and t, and we have obtained the same basic shape of the
solution set as the one depicted in Figure 1. Further, in that figure we have solved δ ˆ
for different values of n; it is of course possible to keep n constant (for example at n =
10) and see how δ ˆ varies for different values of f, or different values of t.
So far, we have used the term “crime rate” as synonymous to δ ˆ . Our model does
however allow for a richer interpretation of what we actually mean by crime. We have
the following four definitions, all of which are relevant for policy:
(i) The number of criminals in society, δ ˆ
(ii) The probability that a worker will be robbed,λ
(iii) The number of criminals in the streets, i − δ ˆ
(iv) The number of crimes committed, c.
An isoquant diagram is a suitable tool for illuminating the importance of  keeping
track of the different definitions of crime. In Figure 2 we have drawn the isoquants, i.
e., the combinations of n and f for which crime is constant. The solid curves
correspond to a constant number of criminals (δ ˆ  = 0.20 and 0.25, respectively), while
the dashed curves correspond to a constant number of crimes (c = 0.02 and 0.03,
respectively). A higher isoquant means a lower level of crime. Note that the c
isoquants are steeper than the δ ˆ  isoquants. This means that if we move to the left
along the δ ˆ  isoquant (that is, we reduce the prison term but increase the punishment f
so as to keep δ ˆ  constant) this policy will actually imply an increasing number of
crimes committed. Similarly, if we move to the left along the c isoquant, the number
of crimes will remain constant but the number of criminals will fall. Needless to say,
                                                       
14 These calculations are straightforward and therefore not presented in the paper.12
it is also easy to obtain policy changes in (n, f) space for which crime increases
according to one definition, while crime decreases according to the other definition.
4.  The Decomposition
4.1 Basic Principles
Several authors have emphasized the need for distinguishing between the incentive
and the incarceration effect of extending the duration of terms in prison. However, the
literature on these two effects is mainly verbal, and there is no analytical treatment of
them. We will now provide an analytical derivation of those effects within the context
of our model. We also show that there is a third effect (the “crime competition
effect”) which so far has been disregared in the literature.
Since there are several definitions of crime we have to decide which one we want to
start from. Probably most authors have had the number of crimes per period in mind,
so this will be our starting point. In equation (8) we saw that the number of crimes per








1 ˆ . This is the decomposition we want to use;
the incentive effect is represented by the term δ ˆ, i.e., the number of persons who
prefer criminal activity to honest work. The incarceration effect is represented by the
middle term, which is the fraction of externees among the criminals. Finally, the term
µ  is the probability that a given criminal will find a suitable victim; with more
externees in the streets, the competition among them for suitable victims will be
harder, thus the term “the crime competition effect”. The number of crimes per period
can be decomposed into these three terms, which means that a change of the length of
imprisonment (or any other parameter change for that matter) affects the number of
crimes via three channels: the incentive effect, the incarceration effect, and the crime
competition effect. The three effects are not independent, since their magnitudes are
simultaneously determined within the general equilibrium model. Still, it can be
conceptually interesting to discriminate among them.
To get a starting point for the following discussion we now take the logarithms of
both sides of (8) and then differentiate w. r. t. the logarithm of n. We consequently13
calculate the elasticity of the number of crimes w. r. t. the prison term. We then divide
this elasticity into three components, the incentive, incarceration and crime
competition effects. This yields the following expression for the elasticity of the
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It should be stressed that the various derivatives are general equilibrium derivatives.
The same holds for the corresponding elasticities. We consequently compare the
values of the endogenous variables in the new equilibrium to the values in the old
general equilibrium solution when n increases by an infinitesimal amount. In the next
step we illustrate the numerical order of the various elasticities by letting n vary from
6 to 100. The exogenous variables have the same bench-mark values as before: w = 5,
a = 1, α  = 5, f = 0 and t = 0.05. We only compare stable low-crime equilibria.
Table 1. Incentive, incarceration and crime competition effects of longer sentences.
nc Elasticity of
c  w. r. t. n
Incentive effect:
elasticity of c








w. r. t. n
6 0.060313 -4.133673 -2.013091 -2.615069 0.494487
10 0.025395 -1.266534 -0.215892 -1.097367 0.046725
15 0.015676 -1.134212 -0.115762 -1.042769 0.024319
20 0.011389 -1.089947 -0.079765 -1.026724 0.016542
100 0.002135 -1.013242 -0.012748 -1.002720 0.002226
Table 1 starts at n = 6 (note that there is no interior equilibrium for n = 5 at the given
parameter values). We first notice that the number of crimes will go down as n
increases. This is rather self-evident. We further note that the elasticity of the number14
of crimes per period w. r. t. the prison term decreases in absolute value as n increases
and tends to –1 in the limit.
The elasticity of the number of crimes per period w. r. t. the prison term can be
decomposed into three parts representing incentive, incarceration and crime
competition effects. We see that the absolute value of the incentive effect elasticity is
large at n = 6, but falls rather fast with higher n. As mentioned above, this is due to
the fact that fewer criminals means that the marginal criminal has a lower discount
rate δ , i.e., he is more impatient. Thus he would be less and less discouraged by a
longer prison term. This would not be the case if we had used the standard set-up,
where all individuals have the same rate of time preference but differ with respect to
productivity in honest work. In fact, this is a feature that would make it possible to
empirically discriminate between our setup and the standard one.
The numerical value of the incarceration effect elasticity also falls, but not as fast. The
reason why it falls is that at large values of n, most criminals will already be in jail.
When they come out, they will almost immediately be imprisoned again since the
number of externees in comparison to the number of policemen is so small. Longer
sentences will therefore have smaller and smaller effects on the number of crimes.
Finally, an increase in n will have a positive effect on the probability that an externee
will commit a crime during the period, but at a decreasing rate. When sentences are
prolonged, the number of externees in comparison to workers will fall and this means
that the chance for an externee to find a victim will increase. However, when the
number of externees is already low, further reductions will have lower effects on
crime probabilities.
We finally note that when n gets very large, the number of crimes as well as the
incentive and crime probability effect elasticities tend towards zero while the
incarceration effect elasticity tends towards -1. However, it should be remembered
that we assume that prisons are self-financing so that prison costs per internee are
zero.
15
                                                       
15 Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the costs of keeping people in prison are zero. If prison
costs are high, we cannot be sure that there exists any interior equilibrium.15
4.2 Empirical Evidence
Table 1 above relied on numerical simulations of the model. For the three effects to
have any relevance for actual policy, there must also be a possibility to empirically
assess the three components of c. We note immediately that of the variables in (8), c
and n are directly observable (we assume that all crimes are reported). Also, p is the
percentage of all crimes that are solved; thus p is observable, too.
16 To be able to
empirically decompose c into its three elements, we need to obtain values of the
unobservables δ ˆ and µ .
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Since we know c, equation (8’) gives us the value of the unobservable µ . We can
therefore make the desired decomposition;
17 equation (8’) is the empirically
operational form of (8).
It is tempting to insert actual numbers from the real world, in order to asses the three
components of crime for different countries, or for different time periods. The purpose
of our model is however mainly to provide a consistent framework for analyzing these
issues. Many of our assumptions are not sufficiently realistic to lend themselves to
immediate empirical work (for example, the assumption of a stationary state; or the
assumption of linear utility; or the assumption that a robber can commit at most one
                                                       
16 We assume that all crimes are reported to the police.
17 Note that the tax rate t is not necessary for the decomposition. This is a desirable property of the
model. In fact, (10) and (8’) can be regarded as an equation system in two unknowns, µ  and t.16
robbery, and that a worker can only be robbed once, per period).
18 Still, these are
mere technical assumptions, which can in principle be dispensed with. Using actual
numbers can therefore be illustrative of what our model could in principle be used for,
after having been developed to encompass more complexities of the actual world.
With all these caveats expressed, we have inserted into (8’) some actual numbers from
English and American crime statistics.
19 The figures refer to robbery. The definition
of robbery could of course differ between the two legal systems, but the data are
nevertheless intended to be comparable. Since the population in our model is
normalized at unity, we have expressed all numbers in per capita terms. The
following numbers have been used.
Table 2. Normalized number of robberies per quarter, normalized number of robbers
sentenced to prison per quarter, and number of quarters before being released.
England and Wales 1981 and 1995, and USA 1981 and 1994. Source: Langan and
Farrington (1998, pp. 86, 87, 98 and 99)
England and Wales USA
1981 1995 1981 1994
Robberies per capita,
c 4 000 , 724 , 38
641 , 162
⋅ 4 000 , 167 , 41
871 , 312
⋅ 4 000 , 336 , 186
800 , 380 , 1
⋅ 4 000 , 747 , 213
750 , 298 , 1
⋅
Probability of being




000 , 380 , 1
471 , 43
750 , 298 , 1
734 , 51
Quarters in prison, n 4.37 6.83 13.67 14.27
                                                       
18 The correspondence between theoretical concepts and statistical definitions must also be taken into
consideration. For example, should p be defined as the number of persons sentenced to prison divided
by the number of crimes committed? Or are criminals punished in some other way without being
physically imprisoned? Moreover, should the number of crimes be taken from surveys or from police
records?
19 Source: Langan and Farrington (1998, pp 87 and 99). The number of crimes is obtained from victim
surveys and defined as the number of offences as a fraction of the population ages 16 or older (for the
US 12 or older). According to Languan and Farrington (1998, p. 20) the typical robber in the US
commits 4 robberies per year. To make the data compatible to our model, we have therefore set the
time period to equal one quarter; that is, the yearly numbers in the data have been divided by 4. We
abstract from the fact that the average number of offenders per crime is somewhat above 1 and that
robbers typically commit other crimes for which they may be incarcerated. As time spent in prison we
use number of quarters before being released.17
The figures on the length of the prison term, n, refer to the number of quarters actually
served in prison. We thus do not use data on formal sentences; in particular in
England, convicts tend to be released long before the formal term has been served.
Inserting these numbers into (8’) and solving for µ  yields two roots. One of these is
typically close to 1 and the other typically close to 0. Substituting into (13), the larger
root gives a δ ˆ  close to 0 while the smaller root gives a δ ˆ a little below 1. We choose
the former root and get the following decomposition of the total number of crimes
into incentive, incarceration and crime competition parts:
 20
Table 3. Empirical decomposition of the normalized number of robberies into
incentive, incarceration and crime competition parts. England and Wales 1981 and
1995, and USA 1981 and 1994.
England and Wales USA
1981 1995 1981 1994
Number of
robberies per capita
0.00105 0.00190 0.00185 0.00152
Incentive part 0.00123 0.00205 0.00265 0.00238
Incarceration part 0.85754 0.93002 0.69956 0.63799
Crime competition
part
0.99895 0.99810 0.99814 0.99848
If we multiply the figures of the three last rows we obtain the (normalized) numbers
of robberies. From the incarceration part we note that a larger fraction of the robbers
are in circulation in England than in USA. For example, according to Table 3, 85.8
percent of the robbers in England were in circulation in 1981, while only 70 percent
of the American robbers were out. This was counteracted by the lower total number of
                                                       
20 In this section, we refer to the decomposition into the three different parts, not to the incentive,
incarceration and crime competition effects. We want to reserve this latter terminology for analyzing
the effects of e. g. a change of n, t or f on the total number of crimes, cf. equation (12). To empirically
assess these effects would require an econometric analysis.18
robbers in England; the English incentive part in England was only half of that in the
US. In the mid-1990s, things had changed; now the number of robberies was higher in
England than in the US. This was partly due to an increase in the English incentive
part, from 0.12 to 0.21 percent. This effect was strengthened by the development of
the incarceration part. In the mid-1990s, 93 percent of the English robbers were out,
while the corresponding figure was only 63.8 percent for the US.
Note that the crime competition part is close to unity in both countries. This means
that for all practical purposes there are no problems for robbers to find a victim within
the specified time period. This is what should be expected in a society with a low
crime rate. However, if the analysis were geographically disaggregated, we would
expect the crime competition part to vary highly between different neighborhoods.
The results in Table 3 referred to levels of the three components. Since the number of
crimes has changed over time, it would be interesting to decompose these changes
into the three parts. To be sure, the changes may depend on many exogenous factors.
Apart from the quite substantial increases in the length of the prison term reported in
Table 2, the severity of punishment (f) might have changed, as might the tax rate (t) or
the productivity in police work. But regardless of the cause, the change in c can be

















,            (14)
where k is short for the incarceration component:  ) 1 /( 1 n p k µ + ≡ . Using the numbers
from Table 3, we obtain the decomposition reported in Table 4 (since the actual
numbers have been subject to finite changes, while the decomposition in (14) holds
exactly for infinitesimal changes only, there will be small discrepancies in Table 4).19
Table 4: Decomposition of the relative change in the number of crimes between 1981
and 1995 (for the US, 1994).
England and Wales: 1981 –
1995




Incentive part 0.66666 -0.10189
Incarceration part 0.084521 -0.08801
Crime competition part -0.00085 0.00034
Robberies per capita rose by 80.9 percent in England between 1981 and 1995. This
can be decomposed into a 66.7 percent increase in the incentive part and an 8.5
percent increase in the incarceration part. For the US, robberies per capita instead fell
by 17.8 percent between 1981 and 1994. Most of this was due to a 10.2 percent fall in
the number of criminals, but a fall in the proportion of externees (by 8.8 percent)
worked in the same direction.
The decomposition (14) can be done in space as well as in time. We therefore
compare the relative difference between England and USA in 1981, and between
England and USA in the mid-nineties, respectively:20
Table 5: Decomposition of the relative change in the number of crimes between
England (including Wales) and USA in 1981, and England (including Wales) and
USA in the mid-nineties, respectively.
1981: England – USA 1995 (94): England – USA
Number of robberies per
capita
0.76190 -0.17838
Incentive part 1.15447 0.16098
Incarceration part -0.08452 -0.31400
Crime competition part -0.00081 0.00038
We note that number of robberies per capita was 76.2 percent higher in USA than in
England 1981. This is due to an incentive part that is 115 percent higher in the US
than in England. The incentive part is partly counteracted by an incarceration part of –
8.5 percent; a larger proportion of the robbers are kept in prison in the US than in
England. In the middle of the 1990s, things had changed; now England had 17.8
percent more robberies per capita than the US. The difference was accounted for by a
drastic fall in the incentive part as compared to the case fifteen years earlier; in the
mid-nineties, the incentive part of the US was only 16.1 percent higher than that of
England. Instead, the difference between the two countries was mainly accounted for
by the fact that the American incarceration part was 31.4 percent lower than the
English one.
5.  Conclusions
Empirical work has to be based on theory. In the case of crime and punishment,
theory is right now heading in the direction of general equilibrium models. There is a
number of aspects of crime and punishment where time is involved in an essential
way. One obvious example is imprisonment. This calls for an intertemporal general
equilibrium model of crime. Having done that, concepts like the incentive effect, and
the incarceration effect, that have earlier been discussed in verbal terms only, can be
given an empirically tractable interpretation.21
There are many other examples where the time element is important for the analysis
of crime. Most of these seem to involve the development of human capital, for those
outside as well as those inside prison. Also, productivity changes could refer to
productivity in ordinary work as well as in criminal activities. A further development
of general equilibrium models along these lines seem to be high on the research
agenda today.22
Appendix: Stability of Equilibrium
The solution of the model does not yield a unique equilibrium. Typically there are
instead three distinct equilibrium solutions to each configuration of values of the
exogenous variables. One of these equilibria implies 100 percent crime; another is
characterized by a low level of crime. In addition there is an intermediate-level
equilibrium. It turns out that the comparative statics of moving from one low-level
equilibrium to another (for example due to a change of  n,  f, or t) yields the expected
comparative-static results; a longer prison term, or a more severe punishment, or more
resources to the police, leads to less crime. For medium-level equilibria, however, the
endogenous variables generally change in the opposite direction from what one would
expect.
To discriminate between the three equilibria we investigate the stability properties.
However, it is not self-evident which corresponding dynamic model (in the stable
case converging to the particular equilibrium solution) to start from. There are many
possibilities and no alternative is a self-evident candidate.
Disequilibrium dynamics
We have chosen to base the stability analysis on two particular dynamic models. The
first one implies that δ ˆ is increased or decreased somewhat in comparison to the
equilibrium solution. The probabilities µ  and p are correspondingly adjusted so that
equations (4), (5) and (11) are still satisfied
21. The dynamic model then comprises
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21 In his stability analysis Fender (1999) motivates a non-equilibrium number of criminals by assuming
incorrect expectations as to the risk of getting caught.
22 Since our model is not cast in continuous time, equation (A1) should actually be formulated as a
difference equation. However, if the absolute value of β is very small the result of the stability analysis
will be the same. Even if the discrete model produces over-shootings, there will be convergence.23
Here, δ
￿ ˆis the time derivative of δ ˆ and β is a negative constant reflecting the
sensitivity of δ ˆ to a discrepancy between Vw and Vc. Equation (A1) thus stipulates
that if the utility of the worker at δ ˆ is higher than that of the criminal, the number of
criminals should decrease. For stability, a fall in the number of criminals should then,
via the consequent changes of µ  and p (equations (4), (5) and (11) are satisfied all the
time) close the gap between Vw and Vc.
Just as for the case of the stationary equilibrium system, we have solved the system
numerically. The procedure was to change the value of δ ˆsomewhat in comparison to
the stationary equilibrium value. The probabilities µ  and p were then adjusted to
satisfy equations (4), (5) and (11). We then focused on the question whether this leads
to a positive or a negative gap between Vw and Vc. It turns out that the low-crime
equilibria in Figure 1 are stable, but not the medium-crime equilibria. Inside the
convex set depicted in Figure 1, δ ˆwill fall. But outside the convex set, crime
increases, as is shown by the arrows in the figure. Consequently there are two stable
equilibria. One is the situation where everybody is a crook and no honest work is
done, i. e., δ ˆ= 1. The other stable equilibrium is the low-crime equilibrium. In
between there is an unstable medium-crime equilibrium.
Equilibrium dynamics
The above discussion started from a fairly self-evident disequilibrium experiment.
What happens if the level of criminality is too low or too high in comparison to the
stationary equilibrium? Alternatively we could ask what would happen if some
parameter changes, for example the tax rate, but the new stationary equilibrium is
approached under equilibrium. The trajectory to the new stationary equilibrium is
affected by history since cohorts of internees inhabit prisons and these cohorts are a
consequence of previous criminal policy. Even if everybody (as in intertemporal
equilibrium) has correct expectations as to the present and future values ofδ ˆ, µ  and p
we would not expect an immediate convergence to the new stationary equilibrium.
However, we have chosen not to anlyze the rational-expectations trajectory from an
original to a new stationary equilibrium. Here individuals need to have correct24
information about the endogenous variablesδ ˆ, µ  and p for the present period as well
as for future periods (intertemporal equilibrium). Instead we assume that the
individual has correct information aboutδ ˆ, µ  and p for the present period, but not
necessarily for future periods. We consequently analyze a string of temporary
equilibria. But temporary equilibrium is not defined unless we specify a function
generating expectations for the endogenous variables in future periods. There are
many possibilities, but a rather obvious candidate would be that individuals (wrongly)
think that the present period constitutes a stationary equilibrium.
We can thus in principle start from the stationary equilibrium system (3), (4), (5) and
(11), but we have to make a correction for the fact that the number of internees is not
described by the number of criminals caught during a period, times the average term
in prison. Instead we have to start from the following equation where the number of
internees equals the number of criminals caught during each of the previous n periods:
∑
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Before we can use this equation we have to solve a conceptual problem. Will old
internees be subject to the laws ruling before criminal policy was changed or will the
terms be determined by the new policy? The most natural solution would be to refer
to the principle of no retroactive legislation. Old internees would therefore be treated
according to the old laws, at least if the new laws were more severe than the old ones.
However, to eliminate the need to analyze parallel law systems during transitions we
assume that the new laws determine the conditions even for n and f. The remaining
policy parameter, t, constitutes no problem from a principle point of view.
A number of simulations give the following non-surprising results. First of all, under
temporary equilibrium, the historically determined cohorts of prisoners drive
dynamics. A small parameter change (for example in f) will not immediately result in
a new stationary equilibrium, but convergence will be rather quick. Secondly, whether
a low-crime or a medium-crime equilibrium will be approached after a disturbance
wholly depends on expectations and not on the starting point. Starting from a low-25
criminality equilibrium is no guarantee that a new low-criminality equilibrium will be
approached. But if expectations are heavily influenced by the values of the
endogenous variables of the old stationary equilibrium, the process will converge to a
new equilibrium in the neighborhood of the old one. This result also says something
about the choice between the three different equilibria. Abstracting from the inertia
created by the cohorts of prisoners, we can jump from one stationary equilibrium to
another (for example from a stable low-level to an unstable medium-level criminality
equilibrium) if the expectations of all agents are instantly changed to conform to the
new equilibrium.26
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